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In a trio of recent cases, Padilla v. Kentucky,' Missouri v. Frye,2 and Lafler
v. Cooper,s the U.S. Supreme Court focused its attention on defense counsel's
pivotal role during the plea bargaining process. The Court recognized long
ago that a criminal defendant was entitled to effective assistance of counsel
at the plea stage.4 Prior to Cooper, however, the Court had not found that
defense counsel's advice to turn down a plea bargain could constitute
ineffective assistance.5 Likewise, prior to Padilla, the Court had not
overturned a guilty plea because defense counsel failed to alert a defendant
to a significant consequence-deportation-that followed from that plea.6
Before Frye, it had never declared that "defense counsel did not render the
effective assistance the Constitution requires" because defense counsel had
neglected to communicate an earlier favorable plea offer.7
To Justice Scalia, the decision in Cooper "elevates plea bargaining from a
necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement," "upends decades of our
cases," "and opens a whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence." 8
Cooper, Fye, and Padilla, however, do not portend major changes in the
nation's criminal justice systems. Rather, these cases largely represent a
rejection of Scalia's unduly narrow view of defense counsel's role and his
belief that a voluntary guilty plea or a decision to reject a plea offer should
be immune from an ineffective assistance claim, even when the defendant's
decision was based on counsel's professionally deficient advice. Given that
"the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is
almost always the critical point for a defendant,"9 the Court's willingness
under certain circumstances to find that a defense counsel's professionally
unsound plea bargaining performance constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel is hardly remarkable.
Indeed, few commentators see these decisions as signaling a major shift
in the Court's general reluctance to find that a criminal defense lawyer's
representation was both professionally unreasonable and prejudicial.o This
1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
3. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
4. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea is not
"subject to collateral attack ... unless the defendant was incompetently advised by his
attorney"); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (holding that the same test for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel at trial "seems to us applicable to ineffective-
assistance claims arising out of the plea process").
5. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1384-91.
6. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365-66.
7. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
8. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
9. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
lo. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent Counsel After Cooper
and Frye: Is the Supreme Court Making the Ordinary Criminal Process "Too Long, Too Expensive, and
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is largely because of the deferential nature of the ineffective assistance of
counsel test set forth in Strickland v. Washington." As Justice Stevens noted in
Padilla, "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task."2
Unquestionably, when judging the performance of defense counsel in
negotiating a plea, the Court will apply a strong presumption that counsel's
performance was reasonable, give substantial deference to counsel's
judgment, and avoid second guessing counsel's nuanced strategic calls.'s As
Justice Stevens confidently proclaimed in Padilla, "[w]e should, therefore,
presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice
at the time their clients considered pleading guilty."'4
Given the woefully inadequate advice provided to many defendants by
indigent defenders who lack the time or resources to adequately investigate,
analyze, or prepare the defendant's case, such a sweeping presumption is
unwarranted.'s If the Court truly intends the right to effective counsel at the
plea bargaining stage to be meaningful, it cannot continue to ignore the
systemic features that render this right largely meaningless for many
defendants. It must be willing to provide relief to those defendants who
suffer prejudice because of counsel's deficient plea bargaining performance.
As the Court reiterated in Padilla, criminal defendants ought not be
"left to the 'mercies of incompetent counsel."' 6 The troubling practice of
some prosecutors who demand that defendants waive ineffective assistance
of counsel claims as a condition of a negotiated plea, however, does just that.
In essence, such a practice nullifies the right to effective assistance of
counsel at the plea stage by leaving the accused represented by incompetent
counsel without any recourse once the defendant enters a plea.'7
Unpredictable... in Pursuit of Perfect Justice"?, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 735, 766 (2013) ("Cooper and Frye
did little more than preserve and reinforce the status quo.").
ii. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984).
12. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (referring to the two-part ineffective
assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). That bar is especially
difficult to overcome given the "doubly deferential" standard of review of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims to be afforded state court decisions by federal judges. Burt v. Titiow, 134 S. Ct.
10, 13 (2013).
13. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739-42 (2011).
14. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
15. For two of a host of articles decrying the extent to which Strickland's ineffective
assistance of counsel standard operates to deny many indigent defendants the competent
representation promised by Gideon, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J.
2676 (2013) and David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken
Promises, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). For an extended
look at the well-documented deficient representation that many indigent defendants and the
working poor receive, and the pressure that inadequate lawyering brings to bear on clients,
especially the innocent, considering a plea, see Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent:
Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 739, 748-64, 779-82, 796-802.
16. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
17. In this Essay we primarily focus on express waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Some prosecutors require broadly worded waivers that purport to waive any and all
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By its very nature, a plea of guilty involves the defendant waiving certain
constitutional rights such as the right to a trial before a judge or jury, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses to testify on one's
behalf, to remain silent or to testify, and to require the government to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to waiving these trial rights,
prosecutors have long required additional waiver of the right to file a direct
appeal of the conviction and sentence. As long as waivers of these important
rights are voluntary, knowing and intelligent, courts have consistently
upheld such waivers,' 8 because the waiver of trial and appeal rights promotes
finality and conserves prosecutorial and judicial resources.
Increasingly, though, prosecutors have enlarged the scope of such
waivers to include waiving all constitutional and procedural errors, even
unknown ineffective assistance of counsel claims such as those that proved
successful in Padilla and Frye. Had Jose Padilla and Galin Frye been forced to
sign a waiver of any ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a condition of
entering their pleas, and if the Supreme Court approved of such waivers,
then neither Padilla nor Frye would have secured the relief the Court held
that they deserved.
Waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims pose both legal and
ethical issues. Legally, the waivers serve to undermine a defendant's due
process rights-recognized by the Gideon'9 Court-by requiring the
defendant not only to waive what is unknown to them at the time of waiver,
but to do so even when based upon bad advice of ineffective counsel. For
example, Jose Padilla did not know that by entering his plea he would be
deported because his lawyer never alerted him to that critical
consequence.2 0 Similarly, Galin Frye entered a plea without the opportunity
to take a more favorable plea bargain because his lawyer never informed
rights of appeal or collaterally attack a conviction and sentence, and some courts have upheld
these general waivers. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, Nos. o8-2o1 5 {-)2-CM, 1 1-2 5 62-CM,
2012 WL 5869822, at *I (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2012) (enforcing a general waiver that stated "any
right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution, the
defendant's conviction, or the components of the sentence to be imposed"). We focus on
express waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims for two reasons. First, if courts refuse
to enforce specific waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, then courts are unlikely to
enforce such waivers as part of broad provisions purporting to waive all appeals and collateral
relief. Second, specific waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims bring into sharp focus
troubling ethical issues for both defense lawyers and prosecutors in light of the Court's recent
decisions about the right to counsel at the plea stage.
18. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) ("The most basic rights of
criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver."); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165-66
(1990) (permitting capital defendant to waive post-conviction review entirely); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (requiring the trial judge to find affirmatively on the
record that the guilty plea and waiver of rights were knowing and voluntary); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (holding that the right to counsel may be waived).
ig. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. Indeed, Padilla's lawyer falsely assured him he had nothing to worry about given his
long stay in the country. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359-60.
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him that a plea bargain had been offered and had lapsed.21 In both
instances, defense counsel had been ineffective, thereby falling far short of
what the Gideon decision promised.
Ethically, a defense lawyer counseling a defendant to waive ineffective
assistance of counsel claims has a personal conflict of interest with the client,
because the lawyer has reputational and other interests in not having the
lawyer's representation of the client determined to be ineffective.22 Whether
the Supreme Court would approve a waiver of an ineffective assistance claim
that would negate the due process right to effective assistance of counsel is
not yet resolved. Such a decision, however, would immunize much
incompetent lawyering from any judicial scrutiny altogether.
Part I explores the challenges competent, conscientious defense
counsel faces to provide meaningful advice to criminal defendants
contemplating a guilty plea. Part II describes the limited assistance of
counsel that too many defendants receive. It concludes that the
underfunding of defense services in many jurisdictions, together with the
coerciveness of the plea bargaining process, already comprise
constitutionally inadequate representation during plea bargaining for too
many defendants. The prosecutorial practice of demanding a waiver of
ineffective assistance of counsel only exacerbates the existing situation. Part
III analyzes the law and ethics of waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims and whether such waivers should be permissible.
We contend that such waivers should not be enforceable for both legal
and ethical reasons. Permitting waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims not only constitutes judicial acceptance of a prosecutorial veto of the
Court's recent decisions regarding plea bargaining, but also ensures that
more defendants never receive the effective assistance of counsel during
plea bargaining.
I. COMPETENT REPRESENTATION DURING PLEA BARGAINING
Frye, Padilla, and Cooper recognize that defense counsel must provide
effective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process. At a
minimum, defense counsel must communicate all plea offers,23 must alert
clients to possible deportation should they enter a guilty plea,24 and must
21. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404-05 (2012).
22. "[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if... (2) there is a significant risk that the
representation .. . will be materially limited by .. . a personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013). See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the defense lawyer's conflict of interest in advising a defendant to waive ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
23. Fye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
24. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373-74.
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not provide clearly erroneous advice about the risk of a conviction at trial.25
Effective representation during the negotiation stage also requires defense
"counsel to advise 'the client of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea
agreement.'2 6
Although this sounds relatively straightforward, the task of properly
advising a client whether to accept or reject a plea offer is anything but easy.
A defense lawyer should not urge a client to enter into any plea deal-or
turn one down-until counsel has done an appropriate investigation,
"including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be
introduced at trial."27 Indeed, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Criminal Justice Standards insist that counsel's duty to investigate exists even
in the face of a client's admission of guilt or stated desire to plead guilty.2 8 It
is only after an adequate investigation of the facts and a proper analysis of
the law as it relates to the charges against the defendant that counsel can
properly advise the defendant if the prosecution will be able to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Undoubtedly, before defense counsel can have a meaningful discussion
about the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement, counsel must
do a considerable amount of work.29 Counsel certainly needs to do a
thorough client interview to learn as much as possible about the client's
knowledge of the facts surrounding the charges the client faces. During that
interview, counsel must begin gathering information about the client's
background and personal circumstances.3o Absent a good client interview,
25. In Cooper, the parties all agreed that counsel's performance was deficient because "he
advised respondent to reject the plea offer on the grounds he could not be convicted at trial."
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). The Court noted, however, that "an erroneous
strategic prediction about the outcome of a trial is not necessarily deficient performance." Id. at
1391. Although the Court did not address the issue because of the prosecution's concession, it
is clear that not all mistaken advice will be both professionally deficient and prejudicial. See Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 16o (1985); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011).
26. See Padila, 559 U.S. at 370 (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51 (1995)).
27. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION
§ 4 -6.1 (b) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; see also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 721 (1948) (finding that "counsel [must] make an independent examination of facts,
circumstances, pleadings and law" before offering client an opinion regarding the plea to be
entered).
28. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at § 4-4.1 (a); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,
377 (2oo5) (stating a "lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material
that counsel knows the prosecution will rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing
phase of [a] trial" even if the defendant and his family say no mitigating evidence is available).
29. For an extensive discussion of the role of defense counsel in plea bargaining, see
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2
CLINICAL L. REv. 73 (1995).
30. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (noting that the Court in Williams held
that counsel failed to "fulfill[] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the
defendant's background" thereby "fail[ing] to uncover and present voluminous mitigating
21to8 [VOL. gg:2103
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counsel may be oblivious to the client's immigration status and unprepared
to alert the client to the collateral consequences of a plea. Moreover, such
an interview often is critical if counsel is to identify potential witnesses,
possible defenses, and areas of investigation.
To be effective, defense counsel must do far more than just conduct a
good client interview. If counsel is to assess meaningfully the prosecution's
case as well as evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of potential defenses,
then counsel must undertake an adequate investigation.3' This requires that
counsel obtain and review discovery material, attempt to interview key
prosecution witnesses, and talk to prospective defense witnesses. It also
means trying to ascertain whether the prosecution has witnesses that actually
will show up at trial and whether the totality of the evidence presented will
be enough to convict.
Jurisdictions vary markedly in how much discovery must be provided to
the defense and the timing of the disclosure of witnesses and their
statements.32 Delayed access to the prosecution's case makes it extremely
difficult for defense counsel to make accurate judgments about the state's
case.33 That problem is exacerbated because of the failure of some
prosecutors to turn over Brady material either at all or in a timely manner34
In addition, many jurisdictions process felony cases very quickly, setting
status conferences shortly after arraignment. In these jurisdictions, a
majority of felony cases are resolved at the status conferences, when the
defense may have nothing more than a police report, the prosecution has
not had time to comply with Brady, and the defense has not investigated the
case.35 "Misdemeanor cases also are routinely disposed of at the [initial]
court appearance."56
evidence" (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted for first quotation)).
31. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383-86 (reasoning that while reasonably diligent counsel is not
required to waste time where there is good reason to believe that further investigation is futile,
the failure to examine a "readily available file" of prior conviction compromised the defense's
ability to respond to the prosecution).
32. See, e.g., Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New
Realities, 2oo6 Wis. L. REv. 541, 573-81 (describing state variations in discovery).
33. Many commentators have described the difficult task defense counsel faces in
assessing the prosecution's case given the time constraints, a limited ability to conduct
discovery, and the practice of some prosecutors to offer plea bargains with short deadlines. See,
e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, "Waiving" Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the
Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1040-47 (201 1).
34. In Brady v. Maryland, the Court recognized a defendant's due process right to
exculpatory evidence and required the prosecutor to provide the defense with any favorable
evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
The prosecutor must also disclose materials that could impeach a witness's credibility. Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
35. Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective Counsel at Plea Bargaining: Opening
Pandora's Box', CRIM.JusT., Fall 2012, at 4, 9.
36. Id.
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In the end, even if defense counsel does conduct a thorough
investigation, counsel's evaluation process will necessarily be fraught with
considerable uncertainty. As the Court observed in McMann, "the decision
to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of
difficult judgments."s7 In only a handful of states does defense counsel have
the ability to do a discovery deposition before trial,5 so generally counsel
has only a limited view of the witnesses' testimony or how they will actually
perform on the witness stand. The problem is compounded because many
witnesses decline to be interviewed by defense counsel or defense
investigators. In addition, counsel seldom knows much about the witnesses'
availability for trial. Finally, even if a case appears strong on paper, witnesses
do not always perform as expected when they actually testify at trial.
Counsel's evaluation of a defendant's chances of winning at trial must
take into consideration the likely testimony of state and defense witnesses,
the likelihood that the jury will actually hear the evidence, and the likely
impact of all of the evidence on the fact finder. Defense counsel necessarily
must factor into his or her overall assessment of the case a prediction of how
the judge will rule on a host of known evidentiary issues-and on other
potential evidentiary issues-as well as how the judge or jurors are likely to
react to the overall evidentiary presentation. Counsel's assessment also must
encompass the defendant's testimony, should the defendant decide to testify
at the trial, compared with the likely effect should the defendant not testify.
Once defense counsel has completed the investigation and carefully
evaluated the case, counsel should "advise the accused with complete candor
concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the
probable outcome."s9 Advice about all aspects of the case demands not only
counsel's estimate regarding the client's chance of winning at trial but also
the likely sentence to be imposed if the defendant is convicted at trial. For a
client with potential immigration issues, defense counsel must inform the
client of a serious consequence, such as the risk of deportation, which might
follow from a loss at trial compared with the advantage of a plea that might
avoid such consequences.4o With respect to a guilty plea, the client should be
told not only of the advantages of a particular plea bargain-reduction in
the change or dismissal of the other charges, for example-but also the
37. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970).
38. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 6o6-13 (describing procedures in eight states allowing
defense discovery depositions of prosecution witnesses and arguing for increased discovery
including depositions to ensure reliable results).
39. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at § 4-5.1.
40. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2010).
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likely consequences of the sentence to be imposed as part of the plea
agreement.4'
Certainly, counsel striving to provide effective representation during
plea bargaining will advise a client in a manner that enables the client to
understand his or her options fully.42 The more successful counsel has been
in establishing a relationship of trust with the client, the more likely
counsel's advice will be heeded. On the other hand, to the extent that the
client perceives that counsel is attempting to force that client to accept a
plea, the client is unlikely to be receptive to counsel's presentation of
options. Counsel's goal should be to help the client make the best choice
between trial and a plea agreement. Sometimes this involves a hard choice
between two bad alternatives, made even harder because the client is often
being influenced by family, friends, or fellow inmates. The ABA Standards
warn that "counsel should not intentionally understate or overstate the risks,
hazards, or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the accused's
decision as to his or her plea."4s Conscientious defense lawyers strive to
present their clients advice and recommendations so that clients understand
both their options and the ramifications of whatever choices they make.
If defense counsel has done a thorough investigation, properly
evaluated the options, presented sound advice to a client, and the client
decides to plead guilty, then-assuming the prosecutor has not withheld
material exculpatory evidence-the client will not be able to successfully
challenge the plea by later claiming that counsel's assistance was
ineffective.44 In fact, even if the plea was induced by defense counsel's
dubious predictions about the outcome of a trial, or the likely sentence after
trial, that may not suffice to support an ineffective assistance of counsel
41. The client should be advised about the length of his sentence, parole eligibility, and
all serious collateral consequences. The client should also be told that the right to appeal after
a plea is virtually nonexistent.
42. Nonetheless, a client who fails to grasp or appreciate all of the information provided
by counsel is highly unlikely to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, when, in
fact, counsel provided accurate advice. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002)
(noting that the Constitution does not require that a defendant have complete knowledge, but
permits waiver of rights and recognizes the voluntariness of a guilty plea "despite various forms
of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor").
43. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at § 4 -5 .1(b).
44. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739-43 (2011) (detailing the substantial burden a
defendant who pleads guilty must carry to show ineffective assistance and thereby undo a guilty
plea). If the exculpatory material was significant enough that it was likely to have affected the
lawyer's recommendation and the defendant's decision to plead guilty rather than go to trial,
then the defendant may be able to show the requisite prejudice that would warrant setting aside
a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). For a look at the varied approaches
courts take on the question of whether a defendant can challenge a guilty plea based on a
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, see Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea
Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81
FoRDHAM L. REv. 3599 (2013)-
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claim.45 As the Court observed in McMann, "[w]aiving trial entails the
inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent
attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a
court's judgment might be on given facts."46 Unquestionably, defendants
who did, in fact, receive competent advice following an adequate
investigation will be bound by their plea decisions.47
II. THE LIMITED ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Not all defendants receive competent advice, however. The Court's
presumption that criminal defense lawyers generally provide competent
advice to their clients about plea bargains48 flies in the face of a host of
studies showing that many defendants in underfunded jurisdictions across
the United States receive woeful representation.49 Surely the "meet 'em and
plead 'em" attitude that marks the plea bargaining efforts of too many
indigent defenders cannot be seriously described as effective.so Admittedly,
those defendants fortunate enough to be charged in a jurisdiction with
adequate resources so that they are represented by well-trained defense
lawyers with the time to properly prepare and with access to investigative and
expert services are likely to receive competent advice.5' Similarly, defendants
who can afford to retain defense lawyers with the time, resources, and
expertise to provide them competent advice about a prospective plea
bargain may be presumed to receive effective assistance of counsel at the
plea stage.
For indigent defendants in an underfunded jurisdiction, however, too
many are represented by an inexperienced or overwhelmed lawyer with a
crushing caseload that prevents counsel from doing anything more on a case
other than a cursory interview and the presentation of the prosecutor's plea
45. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012). For an excellent look at the difficulty
of proving that a defendant's guilty plea was based on erroneous advice, see Bruce A. Green,
judicial Rationalizations for Rationing justice: How Sixth Amendment Doctrine Undermines Reform, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1729 (2002).
46. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970).
47. Id.
48. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
49. For a summary of the "national reports, individual state studies, and articles"
lamenting the inadequate representation provided many indigent defendants in underfunded
jurisdictions across this country, see Rodney Uphoff, Forward to Symposium: Broke and Broken: Can
We Fix Our State Indigent Defense System, 75 Mo. L. REV. 667, 667-68 (2010) (footnotes
omitted).
50. See Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death Penalty and Other Criminal Cases:
Neglect of the Most Fundamental Right and What We Should Do About It, 1i J.L. Soc'Y 1, 17 (201 o).
51. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond justiflcations: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, io6 HARv. L. REV. 1239, 1263-66 (1993) (describing the high quality representation
provided by the Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service).
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offer.52 Galin Frye's lawyer did not make a strategic choice to decline to relay
the prosecutor's offer because he thought it was unreasonable or that Frye
had a case worth taking to trial. Rather, he was struggling with a crushing
caseload that so preoccupied him that he did not even find the time to
communicate a favorable plea offer to Frye.ss
For those defendants who earn minimum wage and do not qualify for
an indigent defender, the prospects for competent advice are equally
bleak.54 They, too, do not receive the benefit of a thorough investigation,
careful analysis of the evidence against them, nor any candid explanation of
the advantages and disadvantages of taking the prosecution's plea offer.
Rarely do their lawyers have time to conduct legal research, file motions,
locate witnesses, or investigate possible defenses. Realistically, like the
indigent defendant represented by the overburdened contract lawyer or
public defender, these defendants receive only limited advice and often do
not have any meaningful option but to plead guilty.ss
Although the Court has made it clear that a defendant is not entitled to
a skilled negotiator who performs consistent with best practices,5 6 it has long
proclaimed that a defendant should not be left to the mercy of an
incompetent lawyer.57 If the Court is serious that defendants are, in fact,
entitled to effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, then the
Court should not presume that any defense lawyer can proffer
constitutionally competent advice without having done an adequate
investigation of the facts and law involved in a defendant's case.58 Absent an
52. In a workload study of the Missouri State Public Defender ("MSPD") system, MSPD
lawyers reported that in 20 to 40% of cases resulting in guilty pleas, the defender did not have
complete discovery or failed to review discovery with the client before advising the client to
accept the plea offer. Missouri State Public Defender Workload Survey 2oo6 (on file with
authors). In 6o to 8o% of cases resulting in a guilty plea, the defender never contacted or
interviewed the State's endorsed witnesses before advising the client to accept the plea offer. Id.
In over 8o% of cases resulting in a guilty plea, the defender never reviewed the physical
evidence or did not visit the crime scene before advising the client to accept the plea. Id.
Finally, in over 8o% of the cases resulting in a guilty plea, the defender never obtained,
received or investigated the client's medical or mental health records for use in mitigating
before sentencing. Id.
53. In Missouri, where a public defender represented Galin Frye, a caseload study in 2010
demonstrated that the State of Missouri Public Defender system was short 125 lawyers
according to national guidelines. See Peter A. Joy, Rationingjustice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH.
U. J. L. & POL'Y 205, 209 (2011). Such understaffing leads to unreasonable caseloads that
public defenders are "drowning in cases." Id.
54. See Uphoff, supra note 15, at 748-54.
55. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1181-1206 (1975) (detailing the practices of privately retained lawyers who pressure
their clients into guilty pleas).
56. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740 (2011).
57. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
58. In legal malpractice cases, courts routinely find that counsel's advice regarding a
proposed settlement in a civil case may be negligent if it was not based on a diligent
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adequate investigation and proper preparation, defense counsel cannot
possibly give a professionally competent estimate of the defendant's chances
of success at trial. Absent proper preparation, defense counsel has little
ability to negotiate effectively; rather, the defendant only receives a one-
sided description of the merits of the plea offer with an unsupported
prediction that a trial is hopeless. Contrary to the Court's assurance in Premo
v. Moore that "[m]any defendants reasonably enter plea agreements even
though there is a significant probability-much more than a reasonable
doubt-that they would be acquitted if they proceeded to trial,"59 our
experience and the literature teach us that very few defendants are ever told
by competent counsel that there is a "significant" probability of acquittal.6 o
Most defendants plead guilty because their counsel tells them that they have
little to no chance to win at trial, and that if they lose at trial, their sentence
will be much worse.6 '
Of course, even an adequate investigation does not necessarily ensure
that a defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel prior to
entering a plea. Even if a defense lawyer conducts a competent investigation,
it does not mean that an inexperienced or poor lawyer will properly analyze
the law or evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a client's case. The
lawyer in Cooper may have adequately investigated the case, yet he gave his
client ill-founded advice which caused the client to believe that the
prosecution would be unable to convict him at trial.6 .
Undoubtedly, there are inexperienced or incompetent defense lawyers
who will make the effort to investigate, but who will then offer their clients
an overly pessimistic evaluation of the risk of going to trial. Absent an
instance as in Cooper where the defendant can convincingly demonstrate that
counsel's advice was clearly unsound, however, it will be exceedingly difficult
for a client to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following
a client's decision to plead guilty rather than risk trial. The Court's long-
standing application of the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel 6s from McMann to Premo shows that the Court is unwilling to engage
investigation and adequate preparation. See, e.g., Grayson v. Wofsey, 646 A.2d 195, 199-200
(Conn. 1994).
59. Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 744.
6o. To the contrary, numerous commentators have described the manner in which
defense lawyers often oversell the virtue of pleading guilty in part by claiming that the odds for
success at trial are slim to none. See, e.g., Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209.
61. See, e.g., Green, supra note to, at 737-41.
62. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012). For a recent case that highlights the
difficulty a client faces in proving that counsel's advice to turn down a plea offer and go to trial
constituted ineffective assistance, see Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013).
63. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court held that to prove an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant must prove both objectively
unreasonable performance by the lawyer and prejudice-a reasonable probability that the
[VOL. 99:21032114
2014] EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL INPLEA BARGAINING 2115
in an intrusive post-trial inquiry and second-guess reasonably competent
advice that induces a defendant to plead guilty. 64 Although the Court may
be willing to find that questionable advice based on a failure to investigate
constitutes ineffective representation, 65 it is unlikely that the Court will
second-guess the risk assessment of a lawyer recommending against trial if
that assessment, albeit questionable, was grounded on an adequate
investigation. 66
Accordingly, Cooper, Frye, and Padilla do nothing to address the features
of our plea-bargain-driven criminal justice system that too often compromise
a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. First, as has already
been noted, too many criminal defendants in underfunded jurisdictions
have an indigent defender who is not ready, able, or willing to go to trial.
Similarly, a sizeable number of defendants who do not qualify as indigent
lack sufficient funds to retain a private lawyer willing and able to devote
adequate time to investigate and to prepare for trial. For these defendants,
the promise of effective assistance at the plea bargaining stage is virtually
meaningless. These defendants realistically do not have the option of
turning down the prosecutor's plea offer and going to trial because few
defendants are willing to risk going to trial with an unprepared, seemingly
disinterested lawyer.
Second, even for defendants fortunate enough to be represented by a
competent, zealous lawyer, the "give and take" of the plea bargaining
process can be so coercive that even innocent defendants ultimately forego
the trial option and plead guilty.6 7 The incredible leverage that the
prosecutor wields-the threat of a much harsher sentence if convicted at
trial, of additional charges, of the use of sentencing enhancers, or of the
death penalty-tends to raise the potential penalty of going to trial to the
point where few are willing to run the risk.68 Frye, Cooper, and Padilla offer no
comfort to the defendant who relies on the recommendation of a reasonably
lawyer's inadequate performance adversely affected the outcome of the case. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
64. Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 740; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); see also
supra notes 1o-15 and accompanying text.
65. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (noting counsel's strategic decision to
limit their investigation of the client's background was based on "inattention" and not on
reasoned strategic judgment).
66. See Green, supra note lo, at 748-57.
67. Uphoff, supra note 15, at 796-802. Although the DNA exonerations show that
innocent defendants plead guilty, most commentators believe that the number of innocent
defendants pleading guilty is even higher than reflected in those exonerations. See, e.g., Samuel
R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, Exonerations in the United States, 1989-2012 61 (Univ. of Mich. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 277, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/solg/papers.cfm?abstract id=2o92195-
68. SeeJonathan A. Rapping, Who's Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor Came
to Devour Those He is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 542-52 (2012) (describing the
pressure and tactics prosecutors can bring to bear to induce guilty pleas).
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competent lawyer and pleads guilty to avoid what the client perceives will be
an even worse outcome after a trial.
The plight of Christopher Ochoa, a young man arrested in Texas for
rape and murder, vividly illustrates the coerciveness of the plea bargaining
system. 69 Ochoa was not in any way involved in the crime. Nonetheless, after
a lengthy interrogation, Ochoa, who had no prior record or experience with
the police, confessed to being involved in the crime while claiming his
friend Richard Danziger actually committed the murder. Threatened with
the death penalty, Ochoa later agreed, upon the advice of counsel, to plead
guilty in return for a life sentence. He also agreed to testify against Danziger.
At trial, however, Ochoa testified he, not Danziger, was the shooter and
Danziger was convicted of rape but not murder. Both received life
sentences.
After serving over eleven years, DNA evidence ultimately exonerated
both men and they were released from prison. For some, it is
incomprehensible that an innocent person like Ochoa would confess to a
crime he did not commit, implicate his innocent friend, and then plead
guilty rather than go to trial. Ochoa's behavior might be viewed as especially
astounding in that Ochoa had not been beaten by the police. Ochoa also
was not mentally ill, but a bright young man with the intellect that enabled
him later to graduate from law school.7o
Nevertheless, false confessions and guilty pleas by the innocent are
unfortunate features of our criminal justice system, and studies show that
between six and eight percent of defendants who have been officially
exonerated pleaded guilty despite their innocence.71 Christopher Ochoa has
talked about the incredible pressure he was under to give the police a story
and his willingness to say what the police wanted to hear to end the
interrogation. He naively thought it would all get straightened out later
when he got a lawyer. Trying to unravel the damage caused by a false
confession is not easy, as Ochoa was to discover. Rather than risk a death-
penalty conviction should the jury not believe him at trial, Ochoa, acting
upon the advice of his lawyer, decided not to go to trial.
Fortunately, Ochoa was able to find justice. Nonetheless, there is
another feature of our plea bargaining system that threatens to prevent a
person like Christopher Ochoa-or for that matter Jose Padilla or Galin
Frye-from ever achieving justice. Some prosecutors insist on conditioning
69. Know the Cases: Christopher Ochoa, INNOCENCE PROJEcT, http://www.innocenceprojectorg/
Content/ChristopherOchoa.php (last visited May 20, 2014).
70. Person of the Week: Chris Ochoa, ABC NEws (May 12, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/
WNT/PersonOfWeek/story?id=1 9 5 5 889&page=i.
71. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETr, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONs Go WRONG 150 (2011) (finding 19 of 250 DNA exonerees pled guilty to crimes
they did not commit); Gross & Shaffer, supra note 67 (finding that eight percent of defendants
officially exonerated pled guilty despite their innocence).
2116 [VOL. 99:2103
2014] EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN PLEA BARGAINING 2117
plea bargains upon the defendant signing various waivers, including waivers
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Such a practice may well have
prevented these defendants, and many others in the future, from securing
DNA testing and ultimately proving their innocence, or from successfully
challenging the unconstitutionality of some aspect of their plea.72
III. WAIVERS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
As described above, prosecutors are increasingly requiring defendants
to waive all potential ineffective assistance of counsel claims as part of their
plea agreements. This Part examines the existing case law pertaining to
waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Part concludes by
analyzing the ethical implications of such waivers.
A. CASE LAW ON WAIVERS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
The Supreme Court has not considered whether the Constitution
prohibits the waiver of the right to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, and there is a split of authority on the issue in lower courts. Most of
the cases addressing waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims do so
in the context of a general waiver of the right to collaterally attack the
conviction and sentence that the government required as part of a
negotiated plea. When there is such a general waiver and the defendant
later attempts to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
government argues that the waiver to collaterally attack the conviction and
sentence precludes asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The
majority view is that as long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary, the
defendant is barred from bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.73 The only exception to enforcing the waiver against a defendant
recognized by some courts is an allegation that the waiver itself was
involuntary or unknowing.74
The courts that have upheld waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims have found that such waivers encompass all aspects of pre- and post-
plea representation, including erroneous advice that lead to the plea,
incorrect advice about sentencing consequences, failing to investigate or
72. A discussion of the constitutionality, ethics, and policy implications of requiring
defendants to waive the right to seek future DNA testing is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
thoughtful discussion of the problems with such waivers, see Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving
Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952 (2012).
73. See United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3 d 216, 220 (4 th Cir. 2005); Williams v. United
States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (1 ith Cir. 2005); Garcia-Santos v. United States, 273 F. 3 d 5o6, 509
(2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3 d 1179, 1183 (toth Cir. 2001); DeRoo v.
United States, 223 F.3 d gig, 923 (8th Cir. 2000);Jones v. United States, 167 F.3 d 1142, 1145
(7 th Cir. iggg); Watson v. United States, 165 F. 3 d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th
Cir. 1993).
74. See, e.g., Washington v. Lampert, 422 F. 3 d 864, 871 (gth Cir. 2005).
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assert defenses, and ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.75 The
waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims has even been upheld when
the defendant alleged that defense counsel's erroneous advice induced the
defendant to plead guilty and sign the waiver.7 6 Those courts that uphold
the validity of such waivers do so because they reason that defendants who
make an intelligent and knowing choice to plead guilty should be able to
give up their right to challenge the effectiveness of counsel in exchange for
the concessions they receive as a part of their plea bargain.77
In Watson v. United States, for example, the Eighth Circuit quoted
approvingly from an earlier Eighth Circuit case to the effect that it would be
unfair to a criminal defendant to deny him the ability to negotiate
substantial concessions in exchange for a waiver of a future ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.78 The defendant might not be able to secure a
more favorable plea bargain if the government were precluded from
enforcing such waivers.79 The Watson court, like other courts upholding the
waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, did not sufficiently
appreciate, however, the coerciveness of the plea bargain process and
significantly underestimated the full extent of the government's plea
bargaining leverage over most defendants. When a defendant is represented
by an overburdened or underpaid defense counsel without the time to
investigate or prepare adequately, such defense counsel is in no position to
extract plea bargaining concessions. Often, the prosecutor makes a "take it
or leave it" offer, and defense counsel convinces the defendant to accept the
offer and plead guilty by pointing out that the offer is better than the
highest possible sentence should the defendant be found guilty at trial. The
defendant, however, receives no extra concession or benefit for agreeing to
a waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, it is merely an add-on
that the defendant is compelled to accept if the defendant wants a plea
bargain at all.
75. See Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance-Waiving
Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REv. 647, 654-55 & nn.20-26 (2013) (citing several federal and
state cases upholding waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleging both pre- and
post-plea errors by counsel). King maintains that the law favors enforcement of waivers of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, though she argues that for policy reasons they should
not be enforced. See generally id. We agree with King that the policy reasons favor non-
enforcement of the waivers, but we also contend that there are sound legal reasons to reject the
waivers when the plea and waiver are the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
76. United States v. Montemayor, No. CR C-to-1 178, 2012 WL 6681906, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 20, 2012) (upholding waiver after finding that the record demonstrated that defendant's
guilty plea was voluntary and he acknowledged the rights he was waiving and the maximum
sentence he faced).
77. See, e.g., King, supra note 75, at 652 fl.g (describing the courts' reasoning in
upholding the validity of ineffective assistance waivers).
78. Watson v. United States, 682 F.3 d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing DeRoo, 223 F. 3 d at gig).
79. Id.
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At the time such a guilty plea is entered, the plea will appear to the
court to be knowing and voluntary. That is because most plea colloquies
require the defendant to state that he or she is satisfied with defense counsel
and understands the effect of the guilty plea and the rights that are being
waived.so But when the plea itself is premised on ineffective assistance of
counsel in preparing the case and negotiating the plea, the plea is anything
but knowing or voluntary.8 '
Heath v. State illustrates how ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea
stage can render the plea unknowing and involuntary. 82 Richard Heath
faced "fifteen counts of [causing] serious injury by [a] vehicle" in
connection with a motor vehicle accident, and, due to his injuries, had no
memory of the accident. 83 He told his lawyer that a co-worker, who was at
the scene, may have been driving and gave defense counsel the name of the
co-worker and where he believed the witness could be found.84 Heath's
contract counsel failed to investigate who was driving the company truck at
the time of the accident and instead negotiated a plea to three counts with a
maximum sentence of thirty years, with Heath to serve between four and
fifteen years.85 Heath's counsel told him he had no option but to plead
guilty,86 but that he could expect to be sentenced "at the lower end of the
range."87 In fact, Heath received a fifteen-year sentence.88 At the sentencing
hearing defense counsel argued that Heath had been the driver, that he had
been drinking, that he should not have been driving, and said, "There's
nothing I can say to excuse what Mr. Heath has done."9
Heath filed a motion to withdraw his plea asserting that it was not
voluntary and intelligently entered due to defense counsel's ineffective
assistance.9 0 Ultimately, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that defense
counsel's performance "was tantamount to no representation at all."9' The
8o. The defendant represented by a lawyer who has done nothing other than pressure the
defendant into a guilty plea faces a Hobson's choice during the plea colloquy when asked if he
or she is satisfied with counsel's representation. If the defendant answers no, then the court is
likely not to accept the plea, thereby scrapping the deal. If, however, counsel has not done any
factual investigation and is not ready for trial, then defendant cannot afford to risk going to
trial with an unprepared lawyer and a likely conviction with a far harsher sentence. So the
defendant will answer that he or she is satisfied with counsel regardless of how little counsel has
done. A full exploration of the defendant's dilemma, however, is beyond the scope of this essay.
81. See, e.g., DeRoo, 223 F.3d at gig.
82. Heath v. State, 574 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 588 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 2003).
83. Id. at 853-54.
84. Id. at 854.
85. Id. at 853-54.
86. See id. at 854.
87. Id. at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 8 5 3.
89. Id. at 854.
go. Id. at 853.
gi. Heath v. State, 6o S.E.2d 758, 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
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court found that but for counsel's woefully inadequate performance, Heath
would not have pled guilty but would have gone to trial. His guilty plea,
therefore, was vacated.92
Undoubtedly, Richard Heath would have readily agreed to a waiver of
all ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a condition of his plea bargain
had the prosecutor included one in the plea package. Given his lawyer's lack
of effort and the threat of a much harsher sentence if he were to go to trial,
Heath really had no choice but to accept whatever the prosecutor
demanded.
Heath's case highlights why the waiver of ineffective assistance claims as
a condition of a negotiated plea is so troubling. Such waivers serve to negate
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by insulating
counsel's incompetent representation during the plea bargaining stage from
any judicial review. It is the equivalent of the prosecutor requiring a
defendant to waive the right to counsel as a condition of a negotiated plea-
there is little difference between having an ineffective lawyer and no lawyer.
As the Seventh Circuit stated in Jones v. United States.
Justice dictates that a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with the negotiation of a cooperation
agreement cannot be barred by the agreement itself-the
very product of the alleged ineffectiveness. To hold
otherwise would deprive a defendant of an opportunity to
assert his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where he had
accepted the waiver in reliance on delinquent
representation.93
The same rationale holds true with any negotiated plea-to bar a defendant
from asserting a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
based on a waiver that was part of a negotiated plea in which counsel was
ineffective is simply unjust.
In Hurlow v. United States, the Seventh Circuit also refused to enforce a
waiver of direct and collateral review of his plea and sentencing when the
defendant "allege[d] that he entered the plea agreement based on advice of
counsel that fell below constitutional standards."4 Hurlow claimed that his
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize that evidence was seized
in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.95 Hurlow told his
counsel of the facts that would have established the violation but his counsel
refused to investigate the claim.96 Hurlow also alleged that his decision to
plead guilty was based on counsel's ineffectiveness because "counsel failed to
92. Id. at 763.
93. Jones v. United States, 167 F-3 d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1999).
94. Harlow v. United States, 726 F-3 d 958, 966-67 (7 th Cir. 2013).
95. Id. at g61.
96. Id.
[VOL. 99:21032120
2014] EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN PLEA BARGAINING 2121
inform him that a challenge to the search was possible, and instead
'persuaded' and 'cajoled' him into pleading guilty by telling him 'that if
[he] did not plead guilty, that [he] would [receive] 30 years to life
imprisonment. '97
The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Hurlow is important because it
explicitly states that a defendant is not limited to asserting an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim solely with regard to ineffective representation in
negotiating the waiver, but that the defendant may assert ineffective
representation leading to the plea itself.98 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
this was consistent with Supreme Court authority that despite an
unconditional guilty plea, a defendant may still attack the voluntary and
intelligent nature of the plea if the defendant can demonstrate that the
defendant "plead[ed] guilty on the advice of counsel that was not within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."99 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he voluntariness of the plea depends on
whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases."'"oo In other words, the plea itself and the waiver
are not knowing and intelligent if counsel's ineffectiveness led to the guilty
plea and waiver. Some state court decisions also reject waivers of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on these same grounds.o1
In his concurring opinion in Padilla, Justice Alito acknowledged that
"incompetent advice distorts the defendant's decision making process and
seems to call the fairness and integrity of the criminal proceeding itself into
question."102 In such instances, "it seems hard to say that the plea was
entered with the advice of constitutionally competent counsel-or that it
embodies a voluntary and intelligent decision to forsake constitutional
rights."103 Alito's reasoning is consistent with the view of the Seventh Circuit
and other courts that when ineffective assistance of counsel leads to a guilty
plea including a waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the plea
97. Id. at 967 (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 967-68.
99. Id. at 966 (quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973)) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
101. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. State, 841 SO. 2d 306, 308 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) ( 3 ecause
ineffective assistance of counsel may, in some circumstances, render a guilty plea
involuntary ... we believe that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may also be
raised ... despite a waiver of collateral review."); Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 2011)
(explaining that the difference between an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that survives a
waiver and one that does not is whether the defendant alleges that counsel's ineffectiveness led
to the defendant to enter the guilty plea with the waiver).
102. Padillav. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 385 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring).
1o3. Id.at385-86.
IOWA LAWREVIEW
and waiver are not knowing and intelligent and should not be enforced.o4
This is also consistent with Supreme Court authority that the waiver of any
constitutional right must be knowing and intelligent.os
Courts that have considered whether counsel has a personal conflict of
interest in advising a client to waive ineffective assistance of counsel claims
also have disapproved of such waivers..o6 For example, in Watson v. United
States, the Eighth Circuit considered an explicit waiver of ineffective
assistance of counsel in a negotiated plea agreement. -o7 The Watson court
declined to approve of the explicit waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel
noting, "[e]thics opinions from various states have addressed whether a
defendant's attorney labors under a conflict of interest when advising a
client to waive an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, with conflicting
results."o8 Instead of approving the waiver, the Eighth Circuit decided the
ineffective assistance claim on the merits notwithstanding authority in the
circuit suggesting that an explicit waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims should be upheld.o9 Similarly, a district court in the Third Circuit
recently decided a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits
rather than approving the waiver, observing that cases upholding such
waivers "do not take into account the state bar ethics opinions to the
contrary, many of which were decided only in the past two years.",no
In considering concurrent conflicts of interest that may be present
when the same defense lawyer represents two or more co-defendants, the
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that trial courts
must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts
of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may
be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where
a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into
an actual conflict as the trial progresses."'
The premise of this cautious approach to concurrent conflicts of
interest is that courts "have an independent duty to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a trial that is fair and does not contravene the Sixth
104. See supra notes go-g and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., King, supra note 75, at 656 n.29 (citing several U.S. Supreme Court cases that
have approved defendants waiving a number of constitutional rights provided the waivers were
knowing and intelligent).
io6. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (analyzing defense counsel's personal
conflict of interest in advising a client to waive ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
107. Watson v. United States, 682 F.3 d 740 (8th Cir. 2012).
io8. Id.at 744.
io9. Id. at 743-45.
i10. United States v. Deluca, Nos. o8-io8, 10-3576, 2012 WL 5902555, at *io (E.D. Pa.
NOV. 26, 2012).
iii. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988).
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Amendment.",12 Courts have a similar duty to ensure that criminal
defendants receive fair representation at the plea stage, and courts should
not sanction waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims due to the
personal conflict of interest of defense counsel in facilitating a client's
consent to such waiver.
In the end, the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment serves two main purposes. First, it protects the accused by
providing counsel to advise the defendant of his or her rights and ensures
both in the context of a negotiated plea or trial that the defendant has an
advocate in our adversary system of justice. Indeed, the right to effective
assistance of counsel is critical to defendants' ability to meaningfully exercise
all their rights."3 Thus, underlying Gideon as well as Padilla, Frye, and Cooper
is the fundamental premise that defense counsel will provide the defendant
with competent advice and effective representation to enable the defendant
to make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to accept a plea offer or
go to trial.
Second, effective assistance of counsel also protects the integrity of the
criminal justice system. As the Court pointed out in Fye, plea bargaining is
"central to the administration of the criminal justice system" but if the
benefits of such a system are to be "realized," then "criminal defendants
require effective counsel during plea negotiations."' '4 The Sixth
Amendment protections exist, therefore, not just to ensure "the fairness or
reliability of [a] trial but the fairness and regularity of the processes that
preceded it, which caused the defendant to lose benefits he would have
received in the ordinary course but for counsel's ineffective assistance.", '5
If counsel's performance in representing the defendant at the plea
stage falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant
should be entitled to relief if the defendant is able to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the lawyer's inadequate performance adversely
affected his or her decision to enter the plea." 6 The defendant should not
be denied relief simply because the defendant's plea agreement included a
waiver of the right to complain about counsel's ineffectiveness, especially
when the very decision to enter into the plea agreement is based upon
inaccurate advice by ill-prepared defense counsel who pressures the
defendant into pleading guilty. To uphold a waiver of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims that was a condition of a negotiated plea is fundamentally
unfair because many defendants represented by incompetent counsel have
112. Id.at16i.
113. As Justice Stewart observed, "In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no
right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S.
333, 341 (1978).
114. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-o8 (2012).
115. Laflerv. Cooper, 1 3 2 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
16. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
IOWA LAWREVIEW
no viable choice other than to accept a plea offer even though it includes a
waiver of the very right meant to protect all other rights-the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Equally important, the widespread use of
such waivers undermines the integrity of the system by leaving many
defendants unprotected from the incompetent representation provided by
an underfunded indigent defense system.
B. THE ETHICS OF WAIVERS OFINEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Although courts are divided on the constitutionality of waivers of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the overwhelming majority of state
ethics authorities that have addressed this issue have found that such waivers
are not ethical. Bar authorities in twelve states have addressed the ethics of
defense counsel and prosecutors entering into plea agreements in which the
defendant waives the right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and ten of these opinions have found that the waivers pose serious
ethical issues for defense counsel and, in some of the opinions, for
prosecutors as well."7 Only two ethics committees have opined that such
waivers do not violate their states' ethical rules." 8
Ethics authorities in eight states (Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri,
Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia) contend that defense
counsel has an unwaivable personal conflict of interest, under the states'
equivalent of Model Rule 1-7(a)(2),"9 when advising a client about
accepting a plea offer conditioned upon expressly waiving ineffective
assistance of counsel. Model Rule 1.7(a) states that "a lawyer shall not
represent a client if . .. (2) there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a
personal interest of the lawyer."120 Personal interests under the ethics rule
encompass financial, reputational, and other personal interests. A defense
lawyer has a personal reputational interest in not having a court find that
counsel's representation was ineffective. A finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel also could lead to a malpractice suit or discipline by bar
117. In addition to the state bar advisory ethics opinion, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") issued a formal ethics opinion that "the rules of
professional ethics prohibit a criminal defense lawyer from signing a plea agreement limiting
the client's ability to claim ineffective assistance of counsel" due to a conflict of interest between
the lawyer and client and because such a waiver could operate to limit liability to the client.
NACDL Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 12-02 (2012).
18. See infra notes I 26-29 and accompanying text.
Ig. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Advisory Ethics Op. KBAE-4 3 5 (2012); ProfI Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op.
12-1 (2012); Ala. State Bar, Formal Op. 2011-02 (2011); State Bar of Nev. Standing Comm. on
Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 48 (201 ); Va. State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1857
(2011); Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Op. 126 (2009); Vt. Bar Ass'n,
Advisory Ethics Op. 95-04 (1995); N.C. State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 129 (1993).
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.7(a) (201 1).
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authorities. Thus, in counseling a client about waiving ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, "it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer
to give a client detached advice" when there is such a personal conflict of
interest.1 2 2 Many of these same jurisdictions also opine that a prosecutor who
requires such waivers as a condition of a plea agreement violates the states'
equivalent of Model Rule 8.4(a), which prohibits a lawyer from inducing
another to violate the ethics rules.,23
Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont also find such waivers unethical on the
ground that the waivers violate the rule against a lawyer limiting malpractice
liability to a client, under the state equivalent of Model Rule 1.8(h)."4 In
addition, North Carolina and Kentucky assert that a prosecutor violates the
special responsibilities set forth in the state versions of Model Rule 3.8,
Comment [i] to be a minister of justice imposed upon prosecutors by
insisting on such waivers."
In contrast, ethics authorities in Arizona and Texas have decided that
the ethics rules do not bar waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The Arizona committee limited its consideration to whether a waiver of
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was the equivalent of or raised the
same concerns as an agreement between a lawyer and client in which the
lawyer seeks to limit malpractice liability to the client. The ethics committee
concluded that Arizona's version of Model Rule 1.8(h) was "specific and
unambiguous" and did not prohibit waivers of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.126 The Arizona committee, however, did not address the
underlying conflict of interest in counseling the client that other bar
authorities found objectionable.
121. Most jurisdictions require that a defendant "seeking damages for malpractice causing
a conviction must have had that conviction set aside." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (2000). If defense counsel recommends that the defendant
waive the right to assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and if that waiver is upheld,
then in most jurisdictions the defense lawyer is likely insulated from possible malpractice
claims. In addition, a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel may be used by bar authorities
as a predicate for imposing professional discipline. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Sandstrom, 60g So. 2d
583, 584 n.s (Fla. 1992) (finding that defendant's murder conviction vacated due to ineffective
assistance of counsel involved "flagrant lack of preparation and such deficient performance" to
warrant defense counsel's suspension); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Middleton, 756
A.2d 565 (Md. 2000) (finding that lawyer's failure to move to suppress evidence, present
favorable evidence, or prepare cross-examination of prosecution witnesses should result in
discipline of defense attorney after defendant received post-conviction relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10.
123. Id. R. 8.4 (a).
124. Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Advisory Op. 2001-6 (2001); Bd. of
Prof'1 Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tenn., Advisory Ethics Op. 1 9 9 4 -A-5 4 9 (1994);
Vermont Bar Ass'n, Advisory Ethics Op. 95-04.
125. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n Advisory Ethics Op. KBA E-4 3 5 (2012); North Carolina State
Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 129 (1993).
126. State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 95-o8 (1995).
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The Texas ethics committee considered the defense attorney conflict of
interest issue under the Texas conflict of interest rule, which differs from
Model Rule 1.7(a) (2) in that it identifies a personal conflict of interest as
one that "reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited ... by the
lawyer's or law firm's own interests."=7 The ethics committee concluded that
defense counsel would have to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
there was a conflict of interest and, in cases in which the lawyer concluded
there was, "the defendant must be advised by separate counsel concerning
the proposed waiver of post-conviction appeals based on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel."12 8 The Texas opinion also concluded that the Texas
version of Model Rule 1.8(g) did not apply to a defense lawyer advising a
client to waive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.129
Virtually all of these ethics opinions make clear that courts should be
reluctant to recognize waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that
have the practical effect of insulating defense counsel from any potential
liability or responsibility for breaching their duty of care for clients.,so No
professional should be permitted to require clients to give up their right to
competent professional assistance in order to obtain that assistance. Rather,
public policy demands that an injured client not be barred from seeking
relief from harm caused by a professional's negligence simply because the
client was required to sign a waiver as a condition of receiving professional
assistance. In the medical profession, a doctor is not permitted to insist that
before treating a patient the patient must sign a waiver of the right to
recover damages for medical malpractice. Any such agreement would be
unenforceable on public policy grounds.131 If courts view the waiver of such
rights by patients as unenforceable, they should also refuse to enforce
waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Recently, the ABA addressed the issue of waivers of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. In August 2013, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
Resolution 11 3 E, sponsored by the Criminal Justice Section, in which the
ABA opposed plea agreements that require a defendant to waive post-
conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel "unless based upon past
127. Supreme Court of Tex. Prof'1 Ethics Comm., Op. 571 (2oo6) (quoting TEx.
DISCIPLINARY RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.o6(b) (2) (2005)).
128. Id.
129. Seeid.
130. See supra note 121 (explaining that a waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
has the practical effect of both barring a legal malpractice claim against defense counsel and
insulating defense counsel from professional discipline for failing to provide competent
representation).
131. See, e.g., Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 845 (5 th Cir. 1959) ("Certainly, a physician
could not avoid liability for negligent conduct by having contracted not to be liable for
negligence. The duty is owed in all cases, and a breach of this duty constitutes a tort."); Meiman
v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 8o (Ky. 1969) (voiding a patient contract not to sue
medical facility as invalid and against public policy).
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instances of such conduct that are specifically identified in the plea or
sentencing agreement or transcript of the proceedings." s2 The resolution
also requires that a defendant be provided with independent counsel before
being permitted to waive ineffective assistance of counsel claims and urges
judges to reject pleas that contained waivers addressing ineffective assistance
of counsel claims unless based upon past conduct specifically identified in
the plea agreement or transcript of the proceedings.Ms
By limiting the waivers to past conduct identified in the plea agreement
or on the record, the resolution seeks to prohibit both waivers of past
ineffective assistance of counsel claims not disclosed to the defendant and
the court as well as prospective waivers of claims relating to ineffectiveness of
defense counsel that may occur after the plea, such as during sentencing or
failing to challenge a breach of the plea agreement by the prosecutor. The
provision that the defendant have independent counsel to advise the
defendant concerning the plea waiver is a measure to avoid the personal
conflict of interest a defense lawyer may have in counseling a client to waive
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
An ABA resolution reflects a policy position by the ABA, and what effect
it may have on this issue and debate is unknown. Yet, the ABA position
embraces the type of public policy that courts should adopt. Waivers of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims should only be permitted if there
truly are adequate safeguards in place to ensure that the defendant has
received effective assistance of counsel at the plea stage.
The ABA position requires independent advice of counsel before a
waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is accepted. As a practical
matter, though, this position is likely workable only in rare cases. First,
indigent defense services are woefully underfunded and the cost of
requiring a second lawyer every time there is a waiver of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims would likely be too costly to implement. Second,
to counsel a client effectively on whether to enter into the plea agreement
with such a waiver, independent counsel would have to review the client's
file including all of the work of the defense counsel, independently review
discovery, discuss possible defenses with the client, and, in many instances,
conduct his or her own investigation into facts and law. In other words, to
advise a client competently and effectively would require independent
counsel to duplicate much of the work of primary counsel and, in some
instances, to do even more.
132. ABA Res. 11 3 E (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
images/news/PDF/i 13E.pdf; see also ABA, REPORT ON THE ABA ANNUAL MEETING (2013),
available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_ofdelegates/2013
hod annual-meeting-select_committeereport.docx.
133. ABA Res. 113E, supra note 132.
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Given the split of authority on this issue in the federal circuits and
increasing attention to this issue,134 the Supreme Court will likely consider
whether a waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be
enforced. Ultimately, the Court should not enforce waivers of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims for several important reasons. The criminal
justice system needs to have a relief valve for those defendants prejudiced by
the unreasonable performance of defense counsel. The high bar Strickland
sets will continue to block most claims because of the difficulty that most
defendants will have to demonstrate the reasonable probability that their
counsel's ineffective representation adversely affected the outcome in the
case. Nonetheless, defendants like Jose Padilla, Galin Frye, and Richard
Heath should not be precluded from obtaining relief merely because they
were compelled to agree to a waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims as a condition of their plea agreements.
CONCLUSION
Bad lawyering for criminal defendants with little or no money is
endemic in our criminal justice system. Funding for indigent defense is
insufficient, often resulting in unrealistic caseloads. Quite often, defense
counsel does not adequately investigate or prepare cases. It is extremely
hard to detect and remedy bad lawyering, especially at the guilty plea stage,
because often there is little record of what defense counsel has or has not
done. Allowing prosecutors to require waivers of ineffective assistance claims
in the context of guilty pleas simply exacerbates this situation.
Although some hope that Padilla, Frye, and Cooper signal a willingness on
the part of the Court to breathe new life into Gideon, we believe that hope is
misplaced. The Court has long operated on the misguided view that in the
give-and-take of the negotiation process, the prosecution and the defense
"arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power."as5 It follows, therefore,
that the Court incorrectly assumes plea bargaining provides a "mutuality of
advantage" to defendants and prosecutors both with different reasons for
wanting to avoid trial.'s 6 Unfortunately, the Court's willingness to accept the
legitimacy of plea bargaining is not only based on this flawed assumption
about relatively equal bargaining power, but also on the belief that
"[d]efendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other
procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in
134. See, e.g., Editorial, Trial judge to Appeals Court: Review Me N.Y. TIMEs (July 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/07/1 7 /opinion/trialjudge-to-appeals-court-review-me.html (calling
waivers of ineffective assistance or counsel "outrageous" and noting that without appellate review the
system of pleas "looks more like a system of railroading").
135. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1971) (quoting Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 8og (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) .
136. See id. at 363 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)).
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response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-
condemnation."' 37
For too many defendants, however, the protection of procedural
safeguards is meaningless if counsel is not ready, willing, and properly
prepared to go to trial. These defendants do not receive the nuanced
advocacy based on strategic calculations described by the Premo court.
Instead, too many are forced to accept the plea deal offered along with
whatever conditions the prosecutor mandates.'3 8 For defendants like
Christopher Ochoa, what the Court characterizes as "persuasion" is pressure
so powerful that it induces even the innocent to falsely condemn themselves
and plead guilty.
Admittedly, the current system does work to the benefit of many
criminal defendants who receive a discounted sentence as a result of a plea
bargain. Even though many of these defendants receive only the limited
assistance of counsel at the plea stage, they will be reluctant to seek to
overturn their plea bargain for fear of receiving a less beneficial plea bargain
offer or higher sentence if their plea is vacated and remanded for trial. Yet
there are a significant number of other defendants, especially the innocent,
who do not receive any "mutuality of advantage" by a system that largely robs
them of any ability to go to trial. For these defendants, the right to effective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining is unlikely to ever benefit them.
Plea bargaining is the lifeblood of a criminal justice system that is
seriously underfunded in many jurisdictions. Given the Court's commitment
to stability and the certainty of the plea process,39 the Court is highly
unlikely to disrupt that system by overturning a significant number of guilty
pleas even though defense counsel did little to nothing before
recommending the client accept the plea offer. Perhaps the Court might be
more receptive to ineffective assistance claims if the justices believed that
our current system, in fact, was pressuring a significant number of innocent
persons to plead guilty or producing a disturbing number of wrongful
convictions. Apparently, however, the Court views the conviction of the
innocent as a rarity,4o even though exonerations prove that the innocent
137. Id.
138. SeeGreen, supra note lo, at 741-46.
139. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011).
140. For example, during one oral argumentJustice Scalia expressed this point of view by
stating:
I-I don't think our system ever encourages or, indeed, even permits an innocent
person to plead guilty. Our rules require the judge to-to interrogate the person
pleading guilty to make sure that, indeed, the person is guilty. There is nothing in
our system that encourages or even allows an innocent person to-to plead guilty.
And I would be horrified if-if there was something like that.
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are not only convicted at trial, but that some, like Christopher Ochoa, plead
guilty.'4'
Compounding these systemic barriers to effective assistance of counsel
at the plea stage is the increased use of waivers of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Prosecutors, the courts, and the public have a right to the
certainty and finality of pleas, but there needs to be some check on
substandard lawyering that objectively prejudices a defendant. Recognizing
the legitimacy of a waiver that prevents defendants from gaining relief-
when they were denied the representation that Gideon promised them in the
first place-would eliminate the Court's ability to take the kind of corrective
actions that it did in Padilla and Frye. Legitimizing such waivers not only
would run directly contrary to the Court's perceived need for some
regulation of the plea bargaining process, but it also would virtually
immunize bad lawyering during the plea process from any judicial review.
Thus, if such waivers are deemed to be constitutionally acceptable, the Court
will have failed to uphold its constitutional responsibility to ensure that no
criminal defendant is left to the "mercies of incompetent counsel,"4* and
the promise of effective assistance at counsel at the plea bargaining stage will
be more elusive for even more criminal defendants.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No. 01-595)
(responding to counsel's argument that plea bargaining provides incentives for innocent
defendants to plead guilty).
141. Supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
142. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
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